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I. INTRODUCTION
The executioner performs a profound task, incomparable to other
punishments in significance and in permanence. A death sentence is
"unusually severe... , unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity.
... Death, in these respects, is in a class by itself."' As a result, the state
undertakes a heavy burden when it dons the executioner's mask. In addition
to determining that both the crime2 and the condemned3 deserve death, the
State must craft machinery that will make these determinations fairly.
4
Capital punishment abolitionists argue both that the death penalty is
necessarily undeserved5 and that the system governing its administration is
I. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 287-89 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
2. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(a) (2004) (defining aircraft hijacking and treason
as death-qualifying crimes); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.02(A) (West 1997 & Supp. 2006)
(defining aggravated murder as a death-qualifying crime). Although states enjoy some freedom
in defining which crimes might merit death, "the Constitution contemplates that in the end [the
Supreme Court's] judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the
death penalty under the Eighth Amendment." Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
Thus, states' discretion in this arena is not unlimited. See, e.g., id. at 592 (holding that the U.S.
Constitution forbids a death sentence for the rape of an adult woman).
3. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3)(a)(2) (2001) (listing "character and
propensities of the offender" as considerations in setting punishment for first-degree murder);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (West 1997 & Supp. 2006) (listing "history, character, and
background of the offender" as considerations in imposing death penalty). Once again, it is the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Constitution that ultimately guarantees this
practice. "[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the
rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect
of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978) (footnote and emphasis omitted). See also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
304 (1976) ("[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and
the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process
of inflicting the penalty of death.") (citation omitted).
4. As Justice Douglas wrote in Furman v. Georgia:
The high service rendered by the 'cruel and unusual' punishment clause of
the Eighth Amendment is to require legislatures to write penal laws that are
evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to it
that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to
unpopular groups.
408 U.S. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
5. See, e.g., Bryan Stevenson, Close to Death: Reflections on Race and Capital
Punishment in America, in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY: SHOULD AMERICA HAVE CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT? THE EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES MAKE THEIR BEST CASE 76, 76 (Hugo Adam Bedau
& Paul G. Cassell eds., 2004) ("[E]ach of us is more than the worst thing we've ever done.").
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inherently unfair.6 But even those who favor capital punishment-those
principled executioners who advocate for the death penalty in good faith-
surely would be appalled to discover a thumb on the scale of their
machinery. And yet the practice of death-qualifying capital juries-the way
in which we question prospective jurors to ensure that their views
concerning the death penalty would not interfere with their ability to
serve---lays just such a thumb on the prosecutor's side of the scale. Long-
suspected,8 later presumed, 9 and recently reconfirmed, ° this practice of
death qualification skews capital juries towards both guilt and death.
Recent efforts to ameliorate death qualification's bias have been stymied,
principally by statutory unitary jury requirements like the one found in the
Federal Death Penalty Act ("FDPA")." Statutes like these, which require
that the same jury that determined guilt also determine punishment,
combine with prevalent death qualification practices to unconscionably
disadvantage defendants.
This article calls on all principled executioners to insist on reform. Part II
points to recent events, signaling strongly that now is the right time to bring
increased fairness to existing capital punishment procedures. Part III
explains the issues at stake, provides a brief primer on our current
processes, and lays bare some of the mechanisms that unfairly disadvantage
6. Id. at 78 ("[C]apital punishment in America is a lottery . . . that is shaped by the
constraints of poverty, race, geography, and local politics.").
7. "[If] the juror's views [on the death penalty] would 'prevent or substantially impair the
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath,"' then that
juror may be excused for cause. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (quoting Adams
v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
8. See infra Part III.B. 1.
9. See infra Part III.B.2.
10. See infra Part III.B.3.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b)(1) (2000). See also ALA. CODE § 13A-5-43(a) (LexisNexis 2005);
ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(D) (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(3) (2006); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(a) (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(b) (West 2001); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(b) (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b) to (c) (2004); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 19-2515(5)(b) (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(d) (West 2002); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-50-2-9(d) (LexisNexis 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(1)(b) (West 2005);
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.1(A) (1997); MD. CODE ANN., CRtM. LAW § 2-303(c)
(LexisNexis 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(1) (2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520(2)(a)
(2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(11) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(1) (West
2005); N.M. STAT. § 31-20A-l(B) (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(2) (2005); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (West 1997 & Supp. 2006); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
701.10(A) (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. §163.150(l)(a) (2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
9 7 1l(a)(1) (West 1998 & Supp. 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (2003); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 23A-27A-2 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(a) (2003); UTAH CODE ANN, § 76-
3-207(l)(c) (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3(C) (2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
10.95.050(3) (LexisNexis 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(b) (2005).
38:0769] 771
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capital defendants. Part IV explores the unitary jury requirement, noting the
double-bind in which it places defendants. Death-qualifying a unitary jury
before the conviction stage asks jurors to presume the defendant is guilty
before the trial has even begun. Waiting to death-qualify the unitary jury
until after conviction, on the other hand, means that jurors will be asked
about their willingness to impose death after having heard every grisly
detail of the crime, but not a scrap of evidence in mitigation. Part IV then
considers the arguments for and against the unitary jury's alternative of true
bifurcation. Ultimately concluding that the only real barrier to the improved
fairness true bifurcation offers is the unitary jury requirement itself, this
article advocates for the requirement's repeal.
II. GATHERING FORCES
"In its quest for a jury capable of imposing the death penalty, the State
produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die.' 2 The
Court uttered this stirring assessment of the state of death qualification in
1968, and yet so very little has changed since then. As revealed by the
Herculean research effort of the Capital Jury Project-interviewing
approximately 1200 jurors who collectively served on over 350 capital trials
in fourteen states"3-the death qualification process today still seats juries
uncommonly willing to find guilt and uncommonly willing to mete out
death. 14
Recent events, however, demonstrate that attention to the death penalty
in general-and to the interaction of the unitary jury requirement with
present death qualification procedures in particular-is rising. The Illinois
moratorium in the year 2000 brought tremendous public attention to the
horror of executing innocent persons. 5 Shocked that his state had sentenced
thirteen innocent people to death 6-- and that journalism students proved
one of these men to be innocent less than two days before the State would
have killed him for a crime he did not commit' 7 -Illinois Governor George
12. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520-21 (1968).
13. William J. Bowers & Wanda D. Foglia, Still Singularly Agonizing: Law's Failure to
Purge Arbitrariness from Capital Sentencing, 39 CRIm. L. BULL. 51, 51 (2003).
14. See id. at 84-86.
15. See, e.g., Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts, Bars Executions, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2000, at Al.
16. Id.
17. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1 (2002),
available at http://state.il.us/defender/report.pdf (reporting the findings of Illinois Governor
George Ryan's Commission on Capital Punishment).
772 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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Ryan declared a moratorium on executions in Illinois on January 31, 2000. 8
The governor announced that he "cannot support a system ... so fraught
with error [that it] has come so close to the ultimate nightmare, the state's
taking of innocent life."' 9 Numerous states initiated probes into their own
death penalty schemes,2 ° while cries for DNA evidence and other
protections flooded the country.2'
Undoubtedly affected by the tenor of the times, when Mitt Romney ran
for Massachusetts Governor as a tough-on-crime conservative, he promised
to bring capital punishment back to the Commonwealth, but in a "failsafe"
form. 23 Following his election, he appointed a blue-ribbon "Governor's
Council on Capital Punishment" ("Governor's Council") in 2003.24
Governor Romney charged this group with developing the promised law.
Apparently unwilling to guarantee its recommendations completely failsafe,
the Governor's Council nevertheless was only slightly more modest: it
declared its finished product "as infallible[] as humanly possible. 25
The Report of the Governor's Council on Capital Punishment ("Report")
generated considerable interest beyond Massachusetts: The New York Times
Magazine named the Report one of the "most noteworthy ideas" of 2004,26
18. Id. In 1997, the American Bar Association recommended that every jurisdiction with a
death penalty declare a moratorium "until the jurisdiction implements policies and procedures
... intended to (1) ensure that death penalty cases are administered fairly and impartially, in
accordance with due process, and (2) minimize the risk that innocent persons may be executed."
AM. BAR. ASS'N, MORATORIUM RESOLUTION, DEATH PENALTY MORATORIUM IMPLEMENTATION
PROJECT (1997), available at http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/resolution.html.
19. Johnson, supra note 15.
20. See, e.g., Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Death Penalty Debate Slowly Shifts:
Executions Continue but Face More Scrutiny, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31, 2001, § I at 1 (listing states
considering death penalty reform).
21. See, e.g., David Feige, The Dark Side of Innocence, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2003, at B15
(discussing "steady stream of exonerations," "fallib[ility of] the criminal justice system," and
resulting "innocence movement").
22. Massachusetts ceased executing prisoners in 1947. Scott Helman, Death Penalty Bill
Fails in House: Romney Initiative Roundly Defeated, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 16, 2005, at B 1.
23. Id.
24. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, reprinted in 80 IND.
L.J. 1, 2 (2005) (reporting findings of Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney's Council on
Capital Punishment).
25. Id.
26. The 4th Annual Year in Ideas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2004 § 6 (Magazine), at 49. In an
entry entitled The Foolproof Death Penalty, author Emily Bazelon summarizes the Report's
provisions:
[E]xecute only the "worst of the worst." ... Pay for top-notch defense
lawyers. Caution juries about the questionable value of confessions,
eyewitness identifications and testimony by jailhouse snitches. Require
scientific evidence to corroborate guilt, with DNA matches as the
benchmark. Set up an independent panel to watch out for crime-lab errors.
38:0769] 773
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and Indiana University Law School hosted a symposium dedicated to
discussing its suggestions. Among the provisions of this intended
"national model,"28 which Governor Romney filed with the Massachusetts
Legislature in the spring of 2005,29 were proposed changes to the current
system's unitary, death-qualified jury.3 ° Although the Massachusetts House
ultimately rejected the bill,3 the spotlight on unitary, death-qualified juries
continued to grow across the country in 2005. In that year, three circuit
courts ruled on their respective trial judges' bifurcation of capital juries into
(1) non-death-qualified, guilt-phase juries and (2) death-qualified,
sentencing-phase juries.32 During this same timeframe, as illustrious a
person as U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens invoked the name
of Thurgood Marshall at an American Bar Association awards dinner where
he publicly condemned the nefarious effects of a unitary, death-qualified
jury.33
Create a death-penalty-review commission. And base death sentences on a
"no doubt" standard of proof.
Id. at 73. Arguing that with such copious protections, the statute must be "solely symbolic,"
Professor Franklin Zimring opined, "We have entered the postmodern era of death-penalty
discourse." Id.
27. Symposium: Toward a Model Death Penalty Code. The Massachusetts Governor's
Council Report, 80 IND. L.J. 1 (2005). The Conference was held in Bloomington on September
10-11, 2004. Id. at i.
28. Helman, supra note 22.
29. Cover letter to An Act Reinstating Capital Punishment in the Commonwealth, H.B.
3834, 184th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005), available at http://www.nodp.org/ma/
deathpenalty_4-28-5.pdf.
30. H.B. 3834, 184th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005), available at http://www.nodp.org/
ma/death-penalty_4-28-5.pdf (including §§ 6(B), 6(E), 7, 9(B)).
31. Legislators voted against the bill by an almost two-to-one margin (defeated 100 to 53).
Helman, supra note 22. Representatives were quoted as voting against the bill because capital
punishment necessarily carries the risk of mistakenly putting an innocent person to death. See
id. "[T]here never can be certainty." Id. (quoting Rep. Eugene L. O'Flaherty). "Nothing in life is
foolproof." Id. (quoting Rep. Daniel E. Bosley). Perhaps trying to minimize a foreseeably
negative outcome for his initiative, the day before the vote it was said of Governor Romney
that:
although he still believes that reinstating the death penalty is important, he
does not consider it as critical as making strides in healthcare, education, job
creation, and auto insurance reform. "The death penalty is not at the highest
level," he told reporters after testifying on auto insurance before a legislative
committee.
Id.
32. United States v. Young, 424 F.3d 499 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Green, 407
F.3d 434 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Williams, 400 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2005). Another
circuit addressed the issue in early 2006. United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir.
2006).
33. Justice John Paul Stevens, Remarks at the Thurgood Marshall Awards Dinner (Aug. 6,
2005), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-06-05.html.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court in its spring 2006 term dashed the hopes
of capital defendants who would have claimed a federal constitutional right
to present additional residual doubt evidence at sentencing with its ruling in
Oregon v. Guzek.34 Residual doubt, or the jurors' lingering fear that the
defendant may not be guilty after all, is the most potent mitigator in capital
cases, 35 and therefore has held sway as one' of the most powerful
considerations in the unitary jury debate. Although the Court rejected
Guzek's claim, it left the door to a very limited federal constitutional right
to present residual doubt evidence open just a crack. 6 Whether future cases
close the door completely or not, however, residual doubt will continue to
exert its powerful influence in those states that choose to permit defendants
to argue it at sentencing. In any event, Guzek's high profile provides yet
another reason this is a propitious time to advocate repeal of the unitary jury
requirement.
The time is right for action. While abolition may be out of reach in the
current political climate,37 principled executioners should be rushing to
lighten the thumb that the unitary, death-qualified jury lays on Lady
Justice's scales.
In. THE ISSUES AT STAKE
A. Death Qualification's Ostensible Function
Some people oppose the death penalty so fervently that they would go to
almost any length to avoid contributing to a death sentence. If their
opposition is so strong that they are unwilling to risk any possibility that
34. 126 S. Ct. 1226 (2006).
35. Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors
Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1563 (1998) ("[T]he best thing a capital defendant can do to
improve his chances of receiving a life sentence... is to raise doubt about his guilt.").
36. Guzek, 126 S. Ct. at 1232-33; See also id. at 1233-34 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(objecting to the fact that the court left this open).
37. Whether an accomplishable improvement in fairness to capital defendants helps or
hurts the long-term goal of abolition is debatable: the more fair the system becomes, the more
palatable capital punishment becomes as a concept, and therefore the less likely it is to be
abolished. However, even an incremental increase in fairness could save lives, and the goal of
abolition seems very far away regardless of how fairly the system is administered.
Fundamentally, though, abolition is embraced by "principles that would be controlling even if
error never infected the criminal process." Justice John Paul Stevens, supra note 33. For more
information on capital punishment, see, for example, Cornell Death Penalty Project, Defense
Resources, http://www.lawschool.comell.edu/library/death/links.html, and Death Penalty
Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org.
38:0769]
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someone may be sentenced to death, they are what are known as
"nullifiers." These are individuals who would refuse to convict of a death-
eligible crime despite evidence at trial convincing them beyond a reasonable
doubt of the defendant's guilt on that score.
Professor Hans Zeisel encapsulates the "long and distinguished history"
of jury nullification by recounting: "When English law still had the death
penalty for such crimes as stealing 40 shillings or more from a dwelling
house, the jury would often convict of stealing 39 shillings even if what was
stolen was a five pound note. 38 A guilty verdict on the crime actually
committed would make the death penalty a possibility. If the verdict for that
crime is "not guilty," on the other hand, then there can be no question of a
death sentence. For nullifiers, removing any possibility of a death sentence
is the most important thing.
Though certainly effective at avoiding death sentences, jury nullification
is plainly a less-than-ideal mechanism for achieving justice in the broader
context of crime and punishment. The more common jury nullification
becomes, the more it undermines society's confidence in the criminal
justice system as a whole. 39 For this reason, most death penalty opponents
prefer accurate convictions, but simply reject death as an available
punishment option. If convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant were guilty of a death-eligible crime, these individuals would
vote to convict. What they would not do is consider death as a potential
sentence. Instead, these jurors would impose a life sentence automatically. 41
For them, there would be no alternative to consider. To distinguish these
jurors from those who would refuse to convict of a death-eligible crime in
the first place, this second kind of juror is known not as a "nullifier," but as
an "excludable."
Prosecutors for the government long ago succeeded in convincing the
United States Supreme Court that they were entitled to a jury free of both
nullifiers and excludables. Seating jurors who would refuse either to convict
38. HANS ZEISEL, SOME DATA ON JUROR ATrITUDES TOWARDS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 3
(1968) (citing LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 154 (1948)).
39. See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 877,
907 (1999) (explaining the conventional wisdom that "nullification is a threat.. . to the premise
of the judicial system, which is that laws should be applied uniformly"). But see id. at 958-59,
for Marder's critique of this conventional view.
40. For ease of reference, this article limits discussion of possible sentences to life and
death, but naturally states may craft alternative sentences if they so choose. See, e.g., Spaziano
v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984) (noting that there is not "any one right way for a State to
set up its capital sentencing scheme").
776 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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of a death-qualified crime4' or to consider death as a possible punishment 42
subverts the system. The State may demand that each juror "be willing to
consider all of the penalties provided by state law., 43 Death qualification
was born.
These same considerations govern what is known as "life qualification,"
wherein prospective jurors are questioned to be sure they are willing to
consider a life sentence." Just as a juror who will refuse to consider the
evidence for a death sentence "is not an impartial juror and must be
removed for cause, so too is a juror who will refuse to consider the
evidence for a life sentence.46 Hence, prospective jurors in capital cases are
asked about these matters. If their feelings-in either direction-would
interfere with their ability to follow their instructions and consider the
evidence, then they should not sit, and are removed for cause.47
B. "The Pink Elephant in the Room": Capital Juries' Bias in Favor of
Guilt and Death
This much is all very sensible, and the principled executioner may rest
comfortably, secure in the knowledge that the mechanisms for achieving
justice are well-oiled and operating as intended. After all, who would argue
with the idea that jurors in capital cases, like jurors in all cases, should be
composed solely of those who will follow their instructions and the law, and
who will consider all of the evidence presented throughout the trial? The
difficulty lies in the execution: "A lot of the fighting over death
qualification is related to the pink elephant in the room, which is that death
qualification helps the prosecution win the case. It just does. They like it. I
understand. I prefer winning, too. But that's not supposed to be their
function. 48
One might hesitate to believe that prosecutors would put aside their
ethical obligation to seek justice41 under the siren song of a winning trial
41. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 172 (1986) ("'[N]ullifiers' may properly be
excluded from the guilt-phase jury ... ").
42. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968) (excluding those who "would not
even consider" death penalty would have been permissible).
43. Id. at 522 n.21.
44. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 723-24 (1992).
45. Id. at 728.
46. Id. at 729.
47. See, e.g., LINDA E. CARTER & ELLEN KREITZBERG, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT LAW 57 (2004).
48. Andrea D. Lyon, The Capital Jury, Open Discussion, 80 IND. L.J. 60, 64 (2005).
49. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
77738:0769]
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record. Surely to the extent that most prosecutors would be affected at all,
they would be affected only at an unconscious level. Or at the very least,
they would be motivated by a genuine belief that the defendant is guilty and
deserves death, and that therefore there is no conflict between seeking
justice and winning.
Unfortunately, though, every barrel has its bad apples. A now-infamous
training tape by one Philadelphia homicide prosecutor brings this point
home starkly. In that tape, Jack McMahon explains, "The case law says that
the object of getting a jury is to get ... a competent, fair, and impartial jury.
Well, that's ridiculous.... [You want] to get jurors that are as unfair, and
more likely to convict than anybody else in that room."5 °
Even leaving such rhetoric aside and presuming the good will of those
who instituted death qualification, the ostensible function of the process has
been overshadowed by its practical effects. Death qualification in fact does
skew juries in favor of the prosecution, toward both guilt and death. Fifty
years after these odious effects of death qualification became well-known,
the time has come to face them.
1. Early Studies
Professor Zeisel's 1957 "Confidential First Draft" entitled "Some
Insights into the Operation of Criminal Juries" reported data on the guilt
bias of death-qualified capital juries.5 "[I]nformal circulation" led to his
data's inclusion in "a number of [death penalty] appeals. 5 2 Among these
was the Supreme Court decision Witherspoon v. Illinois.53 Petitioner
Witherspoon pointed to Zeisel's work, together with some other studies
from the late 1950s and early 1960s, to illustrate the prosecution-proneness
of death-qualified jurors.54 As the Court represented Witherspoon's
argument:
The petitioner contends that a State cannot confer upon a jury
selected in this manner the power to determine guilt. He maintains
that such a jury, unlike one chosen at random from a cross-section
of the community, must necessarily be biased in favor of
conviction, for the kind of juror who would be unperturbed by the
50. Audio tape: Jury Instruction with Jack McMahon (1986),
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/deadiydecisions/rafiles/mcmahon.ram.
51. ZEISEL, supra note 38, at 24 n. 19.
52. Id.
53. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
54. Id. at 517 n.10.
778 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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prospect of sending a man to his death, he contends, is the kind of
juror who would too readily ignore the presumption of the
defendant's innocence, accept the prosecution's version of the
facts, and return a verdict of guilt.
55
The majority of the Court, however, was not convinced. It declared
petitioner's data "too tentative and fragmentary" to serve as the basis for
constitutional judgment. 6
After Witherspoon, social scientists continued their studies. The bulk of
that "tentative and fragmentary" data was published57 and the experiments
continued. Professor Welsh S. White surveyed additional post-Witherspoon
work in 1973,58 concluding that "[t]he new data provide relatively clear and
reliable information" to support the prosecution-proneness argument made
in vain in Witherspoon.59
Among other things, those studies demonstrated that excluding jurors
who oppose the death penalty strips almost a quarter of prospective jurors
from the pool. 60 They showed that the near quarter in question comes
disproportionately from the ranks of blacks and women. 61 And they brought
to light the fact that the jurors who remain are more likely to harbor
impermissible, pro-prosecution beliefs such as: "If the police have arrested
an individual and the district attorney has brought him to trial, there is good
reason to believe that the man on trial is guilty," and "If the person on trial
does not testify at his trial, there is good reason to believe that he is
concealing guilt.
62
55. Id. at 516-17.
56. Id. at 517.
57. ZEISEL, supra note 38; Faye Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital
Scruples, Jury Bias, and Use of Psychological Data to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 53 (1970). See also Edward J. Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and
Representativeness of the Death-Qualified Jury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42
U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1970) (not cited in Witherspoon opinion). Although I have not found a free-
standing published version of Wilson's Belief in Capital Punishment and Jury Performance,
that study was submitted to the California Supreme Court, which discussed it in some detail. See
Hovey v. Superior Court, 616 P.2d 1301, 1318-19 (Cal. 1980), superseded by statute CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 223 (West 2001), as recognized in Los Angeles v. Allen's Grocery Co. 71 Ca.
Rptr. 2d 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
58. Welsh S. White, The Constitutional Invalidity of Convictions Imposed by Death-
Qualified Juries, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1176, 1182-88 (1973) (surveying post-Witherspoon
studies confirming prosecution-proneness of death-qualified juries).
59. Id. at 1187-88.
60. Id. at 1187.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1184 n.46 (quoting Bronson, supra note 57, at 7-9). See also id. at 1186 & n.54
(citing Louis Harris et al., Study No. 2016, at 3d (1971) [hereinafter Harris Poll] (confirming
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Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, social scientists added more data
to the growing collection. Hovey v. Superior Court63 recited in detail many
additional studies; all once again confirmed these findings.' In addition,
Hovey discussed a further concern: death qualification's homogenization of
the jury decreases accuracy in fact-finding. 65 Referring to "[t]estimony from
the hearing below, as well as studies in social psychology,, 66 the Court
explained:
The members of a homogeneously composed jury are more likely
to perceive evidence in a similar fashion . . . . [In addition,]
diversity provides a corrective to the distortions which can occur
when the evidence presented at trial is inconsistent with the
preconceptions of some members of the jury . ... [Finally,]
particular behavior can have dramatically different meanings to
members of different subcultures. A jury with diverse membership
with [sic] recognize a fuller range of possible meanings or
explanations for particular behavior, and, it will be able to evaluate
those possible meanings in light of the diverse experiences of the
panel members regarding values, norms, behavior, motivation, and
psychology.67
In other words, similar people tend to see evidence the same way,
whereas people with different backgrounds and different world-views may
see the same piece of evidence differently. There is a tendency to see what
we expect to see, to understand our perceptions as congruent with the
framework already entrenched in our own minds.68
similar prosecution-prone attitudes more prevalent among the death-qualified)). Details of the
Harris Poll are reproduced in Hovey, 616 P.2d at 1321-23.
63. 616 P.2d 1301 (Cal. 1980).
64. Id. at 1323-25 (discussing the Ellsworth Conviction-Proneness Study, published in
Claudia L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors' Predisposition to
Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53, 67-69 (1984)); id. at
1330-33 (discussing the Bronson-California Surveys, published in Edward J. Bronson, Does the
Exclusion of Scrupled Jurors in Capital Cases Make the Jury More Likely to Convict? Some
Evidence from California, 3 WOODROW WILSON J.L. 11 (1980)); id. at 1333-37 (discussing the
Ellsworth Attitude Survey, published in Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process
vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 39-51
(1984)); id. at 1337-39 (citing surveys reporting sex difference in attitude towards the death
penalty).
65. Hovey, 616 P.2d. at 1312-13.
66. Id. at 1312.
67. Id. at 1313.
68. "The general phenomenon-normative bias-is well supported by evidence of
confirmation bias, by which people tend to seek out, and to believe, evidence that supports their
own antecedent views." Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1110, 1119
(2006) (book review).
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Professor Cass Sunstein provides a pithy example of this phenomenon:
"[P]eople may believe that gun ownership is not dangerous because their
own experience, and that of their acquaintances, supports that belief; for
such people, it will take a great deal of evidence to justify the conclusion
that guns are not safe., 69 Additional illustrations abound. For instance, a
man raising a beer bottle over his head and hollering "bitch" at his wife is
ambiguous by itself: is the bottle a weapon, upraised in imminent attack, or
is it simply a request (less than charming, certainly, but not physically
threatening) for another beer?70 Jurors' own experiences and backgrounds
will make one explanation more intuitive than the other. The benefit of a
jury composed of people from diverse backgrounds is that the chances for a
full discussion of all possible explanations increases. With a homogenous
jury, whichever explanation seems most intuitively likely to one will seem
most intuitively likely to all, and the alternative-even if the alternative is
the accurate explanation-may never even be considered, simply because
no jurors were able to see it as a real possibility.
Thus, the known data to this point raised a number of very serious
concerns: death qualification makes juries more conviction-prone, more
death-prone, less representative, and less accurate in fact-finding.
Nevertheless, social scientists harbored no illusions about the Supreme
Court's likely reception to their data. When further surveys by Joseph E.
Jacoby and Raymond Paternoster provided still more support for the
skewing effects of death qualification,7' these professors summed up their
work by saying:
[D]eath-qualification . . . appear[s] to produce juries biased
towards both convictions and the death penalty and
disproportionately exclude[s] blacks from serving on capital juries.
When one considers how long it took the Supreme Court to
recognize the more obvious forms of discrimination, the prospects
for addressing the[se] more subtle forms are not good.72
69. Id. at 1119 n.39.
70. Cf State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 476, 479 (Kan. 1985) (involving similar facts as
relevant to self-defense claim in context of battered spouse syndrome).
71. Joseph E. Jacoby & Raymond Paternoster, Sentencing Disparity and Jury Packing:
Further Challenges to the Death Penalty, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379 (1982).
72. Id. at 387.
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2. Lockhart v. McCree's Challenge
The landmark case of Lockhart v. McCree73 came along in 1986. The
defendant, Ardia McCree, had been tried and convicted by a death-qualified
jury of killing a convenience store owner during a robbery.74 McCree filed a
habeas corpus petition on the grounds that removing those prospective
jurors who were not death-qualified created a jury partial to the prosecution;
for this proposition, he relied on the much-expanded list of studies outlined
in the prior section. 5 The resulting prosecutorial bias, he argued, had denied
him his constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment's fair cross section
requirement and his right to an impartial jury.7 6
By this time, the United States Supreme Court was willing to "assume"
the validity of the social science studies.77 Despite assuming "that the
studies are both methodologically valid and adequate to establish that 'death
qualification' in fact produces juries somewhat more 'conviction-prone'
than 'non-death-qualified' juries [the Court held] nonetheless, that the
Constitution does not prohibit the States from 'death qualifying' juries in
capital cases."78
The Supreme Court's declaration that death qualification is
constitutionally permissible even if the studies are true should have
rendered the studies' validity moot. However, the Court raised a specter of
hope-and ensured a vigorous response by the social science research
community-when it nevertheless devoted more than four pages of its
opinion to discrediting those underlying studies.79
First, the McCree Court declared all but six of the fifteen cited studies to
be "at best, only marginally relevant," dealing as they did with "generalized
attitudes and beliefs about the death penalty and other aspects of the
criminal justice system," and "the effects on prospective jurors of voir dire
questioning about their attitudes toward the death penalty."' Why the
relevance of these points is marginal is left unexplained.
The Court then proceeded to attack the remaining six studies:
Of the six ... three were also before this Court when it decided
Witherspoon .... It goes almost without saying that if these studies
73. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
74. Id. at 165-66.
75. Id. at 169-170 nn.4-6 (listing the studies on which McCree relied).
76. Id. at 167.
77. Id. at 173.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 168-173.
80. Id. at 169.
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were "too tentative and fragmentary" to make out a claim of
constitutional error in 1968, the same studies, unchanged but for
having aged some 18 years, are still insufficient to make out such
a claim in this case.81
This struck social scientists as an appallingly cavalier disregard for the
worth of publication, peer review, and convergence on the same findings of
multiple studies.82 As Professors Maria Sandys and Scott McClelland
explained:
[T]he McCree opinion reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of
one of the basic concepts taught in every introductory research
methods class: convergent validity. There is no such thing as a
perfect study. Rather, knowledge is accumulated, and confidence
in a finding established, when numerous different researchers,
employing different methods and materials, produce a similar
pattern of findings. That clearly was the case with the research
presented to the Court in McCree.83
Regardless, the Supreme Court thereby handily reduced the number of
studies propounding undesirable facts from fifteen to three, and so turned its
attention to the three studies remaining. Unsurprisingly, it declared each of
them flawed as well. Because the studies used random sampling techniques
rather than "actual jurors sworn under oath to apply the law to the facts of
an actual case involving the fate of an actual capital defendant," the Court
had "serious doubts about the value of these studies in predicting the
behavior of actual jurors. 84 Combined with these studies' general failures
to "even attempt to simulate the process of jury deliberation"85 or to
"identify and account for the presence of so-called 'nullifiers,' 86 the Court
declared these studies "fatally" and "fundamental[ly] flaw[ed]." 87 In other
words, three main failures motivated the Supreme Court's dissatisfaction
with these studies: (1) the failure to use actual jurors; (2) the failure to allow
for the group-dynamic influence of jury deliberation; and (3) the failure to
81. Id. at 170-71.
82. See Maria Sandys & Scott McClelland, Stacking the Deck for Guilt and Death: The
Failure of Death Qualification to Ensure Impartiality, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE
PENAL SANCTION 385, 397 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003).
83. Id.
84. McCree, 476 U.S. at 171.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 172.
87. Id. at 172-73.
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account for the presence of nullifiers in the sample population, as opposed
to the lack thereof on a real jury.88
Undaunted, the research community rallied to the challenge.
3. The Capital Jury Project's Answer
In 1990, with leadership by Professor William J. Bowers,89 legwork by a
tremendous number of university researchers, 90 and funding by the National
Science Foundation, 91 the Capital Jury Project ("CJP") was formed. 9
Among its missions: to generate "a comprehensive and detailed
understanding of how capital jurors actually make their life or death
decisions." 93
Broader in scope than any empirical study previously attempted, the CJP
addresses each of the Court's articulated dissatisfactions. First, the CJP
studies actual jurors-1201 actual jurors from 354 actual cases94-thus
assuaging the McCree Court's "doubts about the value of these studies in
predicting the behavior of actual jurors." 95 Second, because the CJP studies
actual jurors, it necessarily studies those whose decisions were influenced
by their peers through the mechanism of jury deliberation.96 Finally,
because the CJP studies actual jurors, this research data remains
uncontaminated by the influence of nullifiers, who would have been
excused from service at voir dire.97
After carefully controlling for each of the McCree Court's concerns, the
CJP data nevertheless invariably confirms what Professor Zeisel's study
showed back in the 1950s: The death qualification process today still seats
88. Id. at 171-73.
89. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 13, at 51 n.5.
90. "[C]riminologists, social psychologists, and law faculty," William J. Bowers, The
Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J 1043,
1043 (1995), together with "[a]dvanced law and/or social science students working under the
supervision of the various faculty investigators carried out much of the interviewing and other
data collection .. .... " d. at 1077. See also Capital Jury Project Interviewers,
http://www.cjp.neu.edu/ (follow "Interviewers" hyperlink) (listing 175 investigators in 14
states) (last visited Aug. 25, 2006).
91. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 13, at 51 n.5.
92. Bowers, supra note 90, at 1043 n.1. See also Capital Jury Project, What Is the C.J.P.?,
http://www.cjp.neu.edu/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2006).
93. Bowers, supra note 90, at 1101.
94. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 13, at 51.
95. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 171 (1986).
96. See id. at 171-72 (emphasizing that studies failed to account for jury deliberation).
97. See id. at 172-73 (emphasizing that almost all studies failed to account for nullifiers).
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juries uncommonly willing to find guilt, and uncommonly willing to mete
out death.98 "Capital jurors hold disproportionately punitive orientations
toward crime and criminal justice, are more likely to be conviction-prone,
are more likely to hold racial stereotypes, and are more likely to be pro-
prosecution." 99
The process of death qualification skews capital juries toward guilt and
death through complementary mechanisms. As Supreme Court Justice John
Paul Stevens recently said:
Two aspects of the process of selecting juries in capital cases are
troublesome. In case after case many days are spent conducting
voir dire examinations in which prosecutors engage in prolonged
questioning to determine whether the venire person has moral or
religious scruples that would impair her ability to impose the death
penalty. Preoccupation with that issue creates an atmosphere in
which jurors are likely to assume that their primary task is to
determine the penalty for a presumptively guilty defendant. More
significantly, because the prosecutor can challenge jurors with
qualms about the death penalty, the process creates a risk that a
fair cross-section of the community will not be represented on the
jury.100
Taking Justice Stevens's points in reverse order: First, the death voir dire
shrinks the jury pool. This shrinkage alters the composition of capital juries
by siphoning away citizens with defense-friendly dispositions in favor of
seating those who are more prosecution-oriented. This ensures that death-
qualified juries do not accurately reflect the myriad backgrounds,
experiences, and perspectives of a jury of one's peers, but instead are
composed of only a certain select kind of juror-the kind who favors the
prosecution. Second, exposure to the death voir dire itself causes those who
undergo it to become more likely to convict and more likely to vote for
death than they would have been without the experience. Taken together,
98. E.g., Mike Allen et al., Impact of Juror Attitudes About the Death Penalty on Juror
Evaluations of Guilt and Punishment: A Meta-Analysis, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 715, 724-25
(1998) (reviewing data and concluding death qualification results in juries more likely to find
guilt and vote for death); Bowers & Foglia, supra note 13, at 84-85 (death qualification
"leave[s] an especially conviction-prone and punishment prone group of individuals to decide
capital cases"); Brooke M. Butler & Gary Moran, The Role of Death Qualification in
Venirepersons' Evaluations of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Trials, 26
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 175, 183 (2002) ("[D]efendants in capital trials are subjected to juries that
are oriented toward accepting aggravating circumstances and rejecting mitigating
circumstances.").
99. BENJAMIN FLEURY-STEINER, JUROR'S STORIES OF DEATH: How AMERICA'S DEATH
PENALTY INVESTS IN INEQUALITY 24-25 (2004) (citations omitted).
100. Justice John Paul Stevens, supra note 33.
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these effects highlight the powerfully flawed nature of our capital
punishment system.
After over fifty years of empirical research, the reality of these effects
cannot be doubted. Regardless of any expressed skepticism on the part of
the United States Supreme Court that death qualification in fact improves a
prosecutor's odds of conviction, the prosecutors themselves clearly count
themselves among the converted.'0 1 For example, they have a predilection
for initially seeking the death penalty in circumstances that all would agree
do not seem to merit it, only to drop the capital specification once the jury
has been death-qualified.' 2 The case of Andrea Yates0 3 provides one such
instance:
Many observers were shocked when the district attorney
prosecuting Andrea Yates, the Texas mother who drowned her
five children in a bathtub, announced his intent to pursue the death
penalty against her. Obtaining capital punishment for a woman
with known psychiatric problems who is accused of killing her
children is almost unheard of. The decision was met by some
defense attorneys, however, with little surprise: "They may just be
trying to get a death-qualified jury . . . to ensure a conviction."
Sure enough, once prosecutors secured a conviction, their
aggressive pursuit of the death penalty transformed into an
endorsement of a life sentence instead.10
The knowledge that prosecutors, who are charged with the loftier goal of
pursuing justice, rather than winning convictions,0 5 would manipulate the
system in this way should, at the very least, discomfit the principled
executioner. But those prosecutors who are convinced in the guilt of the
101. White, supra note 58, at 1177.
102. Id. at n.7.
103. Yates v. State, 171 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. App. 2005).
104. Richard Salgado, Note, Tribunals Organized to Convict: Searching for a Lesser Evil
in the Capital Juror Death-Qualification Process in United States v. Green, 2005 BYU L. REV.
519, 519 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
105. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do
so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones.
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person charged may not feel any twinge at their use of what amounts to a
practical and effective strategy for winning convictions.
Determining whether a given jury is too prosecution-prone, not
prosecution-prone enough, or, like Baby Bear's porridge, "just right,"' 10 6
may appear to be a fool's errand. With respect to convictions, of course, if
we knew which defendants were actually guilty, we would not need a trial.
An objective check on the appropriate degree of willingness to impose a
death sentence seems equally elusive: "There is not a DNA test for moral
judgment. We can't take a defendant, take a drop of [his] blood, and say,
'Oh, yes, the jury got it right that you deserve to die,' or 'the jury got it
wrong that you deserve to live."",10 7 We can, however, investigate whether
the safeguards the law imposes in capital cases are being implemented. The
Capital Jury Project did just that and-far from contradicting the previous
fifty years of social science evidence demonstrating the prosecutorial bias of
death-qualified juries-CJP researchers have discovered numerous areas
that profoundly deepen the cause for concern.' 08 This article focuses on only
three: the prevalence of automatic death penalty voters on capital juries;
capital jurors' fundamental misunderstandings concerning mitigation; and
their presumptions, inculcated before the trial even begins by the very fact
of being asked the death qualification questions, that the defendant is guilty
and must be sentenced to death.' 09
106. See ROBERT SOUTHEY, GOLDILOCKS AND THE THREE BEARS (Janet Stevens ed.,
Holiday House 1986) (1837).
107. Scott E. Sundby, Moral Accuracy and "Wobble" in Capital Sentencing, 80 IND. L.J.
56, 56 (2005).
108. See generally William J. Bowers et al., The Capital Sentencing Decision: Guided
Discretion, Reasoned Moral Judgment, or Legal Fiction, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE
PENAL SANCTION 413 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003).
109. Perhaps the most shameful of the areas in which the CJP data sheds new light is the
continued influence of race on capital punishment. The stark victim's race data is old hat:
among all capital defendants, those who kill white victims receive the death penalty 8.3 times
more often than those who kill black victims; among black capital defendants, those who kill
white victims receive the death penalty 21 times more often than those who kill black victims.
DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS 314-15 (1990). Capital Jury Project researchers also uncovered "white male
dominance" and "black male presence" effects in cases with a black defendant and a white
victim, which powerfully predict the likelihood of death verdicts. Bowers & Foglia, supra note
13 at 77. The likelihood of a death sentence rocketed from 30% with four or fewer white male
jurors to 70% when the jury included five or more white males, while the presence of a single
black man deflated the likelihood of a death sentence from over 70% for juries without any
black men to under 40% for those with. Id. In addition, the CJP data demonstrates that jurors'
interpretations of the very same evidence differed wildly based on race. Id. at 77-80. See also
supra text accompanying notes 70-75. This data, together with the vast amounts of CJP data
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a. Automatic Death Penalty Voters
Morgan v. Illinois"' requires that jurors be life-qualified as well as
death-qualified."' "Life qualification" requires a willingness to consider a
life sentence: "Any juror to whom mitigating factors are . .. irrelevant
should be disqualified for cause, for that juror has formed an opinion
concerning the merits of the case without basis in the evidence developed at
trial."... 2 Despite this, the CJP has demonstrated that our real-world juries in
fact include an astonishing number of "automatic death penalty"'3 voters,
whose opinions about punishment do not depend on the evidence offered at
sentencing, but instead are triggered simply by the fact of conviction." 4
Seating these jurors violates the law," 5 but our present mechanism
clearly fails to prevent it. Again, CJP respondents are all actual jurors who
served on actual capital cases and therefore underwent at least some sort of
vetting to ensure that they were willing to consider a life sentence. Across
the board, however, these actual jurors explained that "the death penalty is
the only acceptable punishment" for a variety of death-eligible murders." 6
Over 70% of CJP jurors felt that death "was the only acceptable
punishment" for murders committed by a defendant with a prior murder
conviction. " 7 Almost 60% agreed that death was the only acceptable
punishment for "planned or premeditated murder."' 8 Other categories
included murders where the victim was "a police officer or prison guard,"
murders involving "multiple victims," and murders "committed by a drug
dealer"; approximately half of the jurors felt that death was "the only
acceptable punishment" in these situations." 9 There was a considerable
amount of overlap, as well: just shy of 30% of these jurors asserted that
death was the only acceptable punishment for all of the above. 2 0 Even
felony murder ("a killing that occurs during another crime"), the category
that lie beyond the scope of this article, deserves the full attention of all three branches of
government.
110. 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
111. Id. at 735 ("such jurors-whether they be unalterably in favor of, or opposed to, the
death penalty in every case-by definition are ones who cannot perform their duties in
accordance with law, their protestations to the contrary notwithstanding").
112. Id. at 739.
113. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 13, at 60-61.
114. Id.
115. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 739.
116. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 13, at 62 & n.60.
117. Id. at62.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 62-63.
120. Id. at 62.
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least likely to prompt jurors to state that death was the "only acceptable
punishment," garnered 24%.121
The numbers of automatic life penalty voters seated on capital juries are
drastically different, with 2-3% of jurors responding that "the death penalty
[i]s unacceptable" for five of the six scenarios presented, and a high of just
under 7% agreeing that death was an unacceptable punishment for felony
murders. 2 2 On a twelve-person jury, then, anywhere from two to eight of
the members seated are likely to be automatic death penalty jurors, 23 while
less than one will be an automatic life penalty juror. 24 To say the least,
these numbers call into question the previously-accepted wisdom that,
excluding nullifiers, the ratio of automatic death penalty voters to automatic
life penalty voters is 1:36.125
It seems unlikely that jurors are intentionally lying about their
willingness to follow the judge's instructions to consider the evidence at
trial and then coming clean about it with researchers after the fact. More
likely, the shockingly high number of automatic death penalty jurors seated
on capital trials results from a number of factors. First, automatic life
penalty voters (those who would fail to death-qualify for their failure to
consider death as a possible punishment) tend to have come to their
positions through conscious reflection. Presuming candor at voir dire, these
individuals may readily be identified for exclusion; they know themselves.
In contrast, it seems likely that many automatic death penalty voters simply
do not realize that is their position. Presuming equal candor at voir dire
(perhaps a naive assumption), 26 automatic death penalty voters will be
harder to identify as a result.
A general lack of knowledge about capital crimes, and a corresponding
general lack of knowledge about the process of choosing between a
sentence of life and a sentence of death, 27 contributes to this disparity. Most
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 117-21.
124. See supra text accompanying note 122.
125. Rick Selzter et al., The Effect of Death Qualification on the Propensity of Jurors to
Convict: The Maryland Example, 29 How. L.J. 571, 606 (1986). See also Adams v. Texas, 448
U.S. 38, 49 (1980) (asserting that those excluded under life qualification "will be few indeed as
compared with those excluded because of scruples against capital punishment").
126. See Andrea D. Lyon, The Negative Effects of Capital Jury Selection, 80 IND. L.J. 52,
53 (2005) ("It's been my experience that people who oppose the death penalty tend to be pretty
honest about it, but people who support it tend to lie and will say upon rehabilitation, 'oh, sure,
I'll consider mitigation if the judge tells me to."'). See also Andrea D. Lyon, The Capital Jury,
Open Discussion, 80 IND. L.J. 60, 61 (2005) (noting that to discern automatic death penalty
voters "you have to ask really specific questions").
127. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 13, at 63 n.61.
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people presumably believe themselves to be open-minded, and willing to
consider the evidence for or against a death sentence. But when asked to
give examples of situations where "they would not vote for the death
penalty," actual capital jurors offered the following:
* war time
" children playing with a gun
" hunting accident
* [i]f the guy was not guilty 28
Jurors' unwillingness to impose a death sentence in these circumstances
is reassuring since, generally speaking, they are not crimes. Thus, while
automatic life penalty voters systematically are swept from capital juries, 2 9
automatic death penalty voters regularly are overlooked and seated.
The prevalence of automatic death penalty voters on capital juries takes
on even greater weight when combined with a related, equally troubling
factor prevalent among that group: premature decision-making.130 Nearly
half of the CJP respondents admitted to deciding the proper punishment
before they had heard a single piece of evidence on the issue of
punishment.' 3' Of these, the overwhelming majority were "absolutely
convinced" and almost all of those remaining were "pretty sure." 132 Less
than 5% chose "not too sure."
1 33
Even though most prosecutors surely want a jury composed of
individuals who will thoughtfully consider all of the evidence before
making up their minds, the fact of the matter is that our capital juries are
composed mostly of Philadelphia prosecutor Jack McMahon's dream jurors.
As he put it in his training tape:
You don't want smart people. You do not want smart people....
Because smart people will analyze the hell out of your case. They
have a higher standard .... They take those words "reasonable
doubt" and they actually try to think about 'em .... You don't
want people that are gonna think it out .... You want people who
come in there and say, "Yup, she said he did it, he did it.' 134
128. Sandys & McClelland, supra note 82, at 400.
129. For the argument that this systematic sweeping in fact overexcludes, and removes
many more persons as death penalty opponents than the law permits, see Susan D. Rozelle, The
Utility of Witt: Understanding the Language of Death Qualification, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 677,
682-90 (2002).
130. Bowers et al., supra note 108 at 425-26.
131. Id. at426.
132. Id. at 427.
133. Id.
134. Audio tape: Jury Instruction with Jack McMahon, supra note 50.
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Sadly for society as a whole, and tragically for the individual defendants
so convicted, the CJP reveals that thcse are exactly the jurors who are
chosen to sit on death penalty cases.
b. Fundamental Misunderstandings Concerning Mitigation
Fundamental misunderstandings about the role of mitigation comprise
the second area in which CJP data demonstrates the prosecution-proneness
of the capital jury. For example, approximately half of the CJP jurors
wrongly believed that mitigators had to be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt and that no mitigator could affect the punishment decision unless
jurors agreed on it unanimously.13 Half also wrongly believed that a death
sentence was required if the jurors found that the crime was "heinous, vile
or depraved" or that "the defendant would be dangerous in the future." 136 In
other words, if the crime was legally eligible for a death sentence, half of
the jurors believed that a death sentence was mandatory. 3 7 Naturally, this
contradicts Woodson v. North Carolina,3 8 which held that mandatory death
sentences violate the Eighth Amendment for their failure to "require[]
consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable
part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death."'139 Without a doubt,
these beliefs lead to a jury that is more prosecution-prone than it ought to
be.
c. Presumptions of Guilt and Death
Finally, not only is it true that "the more a person favors the death
penalty, the more likely he or she is to favor conviction," but the process of
being death-qualified-simply being asked the death qualification voir dire
questions-actually magnifies this effect. 40 This magnification effect
makes sense:
Jury selection... [is] a process of elimination that is carried out in
an intimidating courtroom environment, with a seal, and a person
in a robe, and a bailiff who is ordering people around while armed.
135. Bowers et al., supra note 108, at 438.
136. Id. at 440.
137. See id.
138. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
139. Id. at 304.
140. Sandys & McClelland, supra note 82, at 395 (citing Mike Allen et al., Impact of Juror
Attitudes About the Death Penalty on Juror Evaluations of Guilt and Punishment: A Meta-
Analysis, 22 LAw&HuM. BEHAV. 715, 724 (1998)).
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It's set up to scare you to death. As a result, jurors look for the
"correct" answer to the question ...14
The correct answer to the death qualification voir dire questioning is
clear: those who admit they cannot impose death are dismissed, and
replaced with someone who can. This process conveys to the jurors who
undergo it that the judge and both attorneys-including defense counsel-
all believe that the defendant is guilty, and that the only important task
remaining is to find enough jurors who can do what is necessary.142 That
necessary task, of course, is to sentence the defendant to death.'43
Craig Haney's famous study1' 44 found that, even when all participants
were themselves death-qualified, and all were asked whether their views
would prevent or substantially impair their ability to find guilt or innocence,
an experimental group exposed to additional questions regarding their
ability to impose a death sentence (in other words, the group treated the way
real capital juries are treated) was radically more likely to find that death
was the appropriate punishment. While 21.9% of the minimally-questioned
group would vote for death, the more extensively (and more realistically)
questioned group voted for death at over two and a half times that rate:
57%. 145
Once again, the CJP data provides even further support for the claim.
Because the CJP involved real jurors, there was no possibility of a control
group. This means that all of the respondents were death-qualified through
the more extensive, prevailing practice. As a result, researchers here simply
took the direct approach and asked jurors "whether the voir dire questions
made them think the defendant was guilty and should be sentenced to
death." 46 Approximately 10% of the jurors interviewed reported that the
death qualification questions "made them think the defendant 'must be' or
'probably was' guilty," and that death "must be" or "probably was" the
appropriate punishment. 47 In contrast, less than 1% of the jurors reported
that the death qualification questions made them think the defendant "must
not be" or "probably was not" guilty, and that death "must not be" or
"probably was not" the appropriate punishment. 148
141. Lyon, The Negative Effects of Capital Jury Selection, supra note 126, at 53.
142. See Hovey v. Superior Court, 616 P.2d 1301, 1351 (Cal. 1980) (citing Craig Haney,
THE BIASING EFFECTS OF THE DEATH QUALIFICATION PROCESS (prepublished draft) (1979)).
143. See id. at 1351-52.
144. See id.
145. Id.
146. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 13, at 65.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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Although self-reports are vulnerable to charges of inaccuracy, odds are
good that, if anything, these results showing guilt- and death-bias are under-
inclusive. Many people may have been led toward guilt and death by the
voir dire questioning without realizing it, and many may have realized it but
been unwilling to admit as much. 149 There would seem to be much less
incentive, on the other hand, for people to believe themselves to have been
biased toward guilt and death when they were not, or to know that they
were not so biased but to claim it anyway.
The bias of capital jurors can be chilling in its frankness: "Of course he
got death. That's what we were there for."15 Such revelations have led to
the increased interest in capital punishment in general, and to the increased
interest in mechanisms for diminishing capital juries' bias toward guilt and
death in particular, referred to in Part II. In the next part, this article will
discuss the role that the unitary jury requirement plays in perpetuating this
problem. Concluding that the unitary jury requirement is a profound
stumbling block in the way of the principled executioner, this article
recommends its repeal.
This is only the beginning, as clearly we also must address head-on the
prevalence of automatic death penalty voters, capital jurors' fundamental
misunderstandings concerning mitigation, and their presumption that the
defendant is guilty and must be put to death. It may be that solving these
problems is beyond our abilities, and that the abolitionists are right: the
machinery of death is inherently and inevitably unfair, and must be
dismantled. 5 ' For those who remain unconvinced, however, true bifurcation
offers capital defendants, if not a fair trial, then at least a trial that is more
fair. The principled executioner should be interested.
IV. THE UNPRINCIPLED NATURE OF THE UNITARY JURY REQUIREMENT
Although capital trials technically are bifurcated-meaning that the guilt
phase and sentencing phase are tried separately-they are unified in another
way: the same jurors who heard and decided a defendant's guilt generally
also will hear and decide that defendant's punishment. 15 2 The unitary jury
149. Id.
150. Bowers et al., supra note 108, at 421 (quoting William S. Geimer & Johathan
Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty
Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1,46 (1998)).
151. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 5, at 76-78.
152. See, e.g., Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b)(1) (2000)
(providing that sentencing "shall be conducted . . . before the jury that determined the
defendant's guilt"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(b) (2001) ("If the defendant was convicted
38:0769] 793
HeinOnline  -- 38 Ariz. St. L.J. 793 2006
ARIZONA STATE LAWJOURNAL
requirement maximizes the skewing effects of death qualification, ensuring
that the scales of justice tilt in favor of the prosecution.
This "so-called bifurcated trial," separating capital cases into guilt and
punishment phases, has been criticized for decades.153 Although the phases
of the trial are separated, with evidence of guilt presented first and evidence
in aggravation or mitigation offered later, having the same jurors hear both
phases means that there is less difference in practice than the term
"bifurcation" might imply. "If the same jury decides both [guilt and
punishment] the situation is not different from a unitary trial."' 154
For this reason, three federal district courts recently ordered what has
come to be called "true bifurcation,"' 155 not only separating the guilt and
punishment phases of their respective trials, but also entrusting each phase
to separate juries.'56 One jury hears evidence about the alleged crime and
decides whether to acquit or convict the defendant. If there is a conviction,
an entirely separate jury will hear the evidence regarding-and then
determine 15 7-the appropriate sentence.
A. The Benefits of True Bifurcation
True bifurcation is necessary because a unitary jury combines with death
qualification to tilt the scales even more firmly toward guilt and death than
death qualification alone. Some sort of death qualification procedure
appears to be unavoidable. Because the government has a right to a jury free
of nullifiers,'58 as well as a right to a jury free of those who will not consider
of first-degree murder by a jury, [the sentencing] hearing shall be conducted ...before that
jury."). For a more complete list of state unitary jury requirements, see supra note 11.
153. E.g., ZEISEL, supra note 38, at 51 n.33.
154. Id.
155. For use of the phrase, see, for example, Sam Kamin & Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Death
Qualification and True Bifurcation: Building on the Massachusetts Governor's Council's Work,
80 IND. L.J. 131, 145-52 (2005).
156. United States v. Young, 424 F.3d 499, 501 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Green,
407 F.3d 434, 436 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Williams, 400 F.3d 277, 279-80 (5th Cir.
2005).
157. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 597 n.4 (2002), left undisturbed prior law permitting
judges, rather than juries, to be the final arbiter of life or death. Id. ("[I]t has never [been]
suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally required.") (quoting Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 252 (1976) (plurality opinion)). See also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464
(1984) ("[W]e cannot conclude that placing responsibility on the trial judge to impose the
sentence in a capital case is unconstitutional."). Nevertheless, Ring did establish that defendants
are constitutionally entitled to have a jury, rather than a judge, find the aggravating factor(s) that
trigger their death-eligibility. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
158. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 172 (1986) (explaining that "'nullifiers' may
properly be excluded from the guilt-phase jury").
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all available punishments,159 some means of sorting the eligible from the
ineligible will be required. 60 Given some mechanism of death qualification,
then, the addition of a unitary-jury requirement results in one of two
possibilities: (1) death-qualify the jurors before the conviction stage begins,
as is current practice, or (2) wait until after the conviction stage, and death-
qualify the jurors before the sentencing phase begins.
Although a single, neutrally-phrased question intended to ferret out
nullifiers would seem to be appropriate pre-conviction,161 this does not
begin to canvass the extent of our current death qualification practice. As
discussed earlier, 62 this means that option one (asking at the very beginning
of trial not only whether potential jurors' feelings about death would
prevent them from convicting, but also whether it would prevent them from
considering death as a punishment) creates an unacceptably guilt-prone
jury.
The alternative under a unitary jury system would be option two, waiting
to ask those same jurors about their willingness to consider both life and
death until after they had returned with a guilty verdict. This is equally
unacceptable, as it positively invites jurors to ponder that particular
defendant's sentence before hearing a single piece of sentencing evidence.
As Professor Nancy King put it during the Indiana symposium dedicated to
the Massachusetts Model Death Penalty Code: "I don't think you could
death-qualify the same jury that imposed guilt. I think that at that point the
jury is too focused on whether this person deserves the death penalty as
opposed to.. . before the trial.., when it's really an abstract issue."' 163
Neither option available under a unitary jury scheme is acceptable,
because both result in prosecutorial bias. Asking jurors to aver a willingness
to impose death for capital crimes before the conviction stage tampers with
the guilt verdict by asking the jurors to presume guilt in order to answer the
question.' 64 This makes the idea of guilt familiar and conveys the
impression that all those present believe the defendant to be guilty, keeping
the emphasis on finding jurors who are capable of doing what has to be
done. 165
On the other hand, asking jurors their feelings about possible
punishments after the conviction stage is no better. The first hurdle, of
159. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968) (stating that excluding those
who "would not even consider" death penalty would have been permissible).
160. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985).
161. See McCree, 476 U.S. at 172.
162. See discussion supra Part III.B.
163. Nancy J. King, The Problem of Death Qualification, 80 IND. L.J. 59, 59-60 (2005).
164. Rozelle, supra note 129, at 693-95.
165. Id.
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course, is that death qualification could result in dismissing too many
jurors. 16 6 Even presuming this hurdle may be cleared, however, those jurors
(who just heard all the facts and details of this defendant's case, and who
just decided that this defendant is guilty) inevitably will be thinking about
their feelings, not with regard to the proper punishment for capital crimes in
general, but with regard to the proper punishment for this defendant in
particular. 167 The CJP data already shows the clear and disturbing
phenomenon of jurors-in direct contravention of their instructions-
deciding on punishment before hearing any evidence on the subject. 168
Death-qualifying a unitary jury post-conviction would serve only to ensure
that this disturbing practice becomes even more prevalent.
The unitary jury presents an ugly dilemma: death-qualify pre-conviction
and skew toward guilt and death, or death-qualify post-conviction and
ensure that jurors decide on punishment without hearing any of the
sentencing evidence. Given this dilemma, true bifurcation offers a number
of benefits over the traditional, unitary jury. First, seating an entirely
separate sentencing jury obviates the need to perform a full, comprehensive
death qualification of the liability-phase jury. Instead, the liability-phase
jury could be asked a single, neutrally-phrased question intended to suss out
tendencies toward nullification. 169 The operative issue is "whether their
feelings about the death penalty would prevent them from considering all of
the evidence presented for and against the defendant throughout the trial."' 171
Thus, potential jurors whose feelings would prevent them from finding
impartially on guilt may be detected, while avoiding talk of punishment and
its attendant presumption of guilt.'7'
Death qualification as presently practiced, however, is far more intricate,
and consequently is both lengthier and more expensive than the voir dire
necessary to exclude nullifiers alone.'72 As Justice Marshall noted in his
dissent in Lockhart v. McCree, "The voir dire needed to identify nullifiers
166. See infra text accompanying note 199.
167. King, supra note 163, at 59.
168. See supra Part III.B.3.a.
169. See Rozelle, supra note 129, at 696.
170. Id.
171. Although not ideal, this approach at least minimizes the untoward effects of asking the
necessary nullification question. See id. at 699.
172. E.g., Margot Garey, Comment, The Cost of Taking a Life: Dollars and Sense of the
Death Penalty, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1257 (1985) (citing L. Saunders et al., An
Empirical Study Attempting to Compare the Trial Costs of Capital Cases with the Trial Costs of
Non-Capital Cases (Spring 1983) (unpublished manuscript, on file with U.C. Davis Law
Review)). This 1983 study found that although noncapital cases seated juries in approximately
three days, the average capital case required more than five times as long-sixteen days-to
choose its jurors. Id. at 1257 n.173.
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before the guilt phase is less extensive than the questioning that under the
current scheme is conducted before every capital trial."
1 73
Waiting to ask questions about punishment until the need for a
sentencing-phase jury arises guarantees that the costs of death qualification
are not incurred unless they are necessary. If the liability-phase jury returns
a verdict of not guilty (or guilty, but of a non-death-eligible crime) then the
extra time and expense currently lavished on all capital trials is
unnecessary. Many defendants initially charged for a capital offense will be
either acquitted or found guilty but ineligible for the death penalty.
1 74
Acquitted persons are not sentenced at all, of course, and those convicted of
non-death-eligible crimes are sentenced by judges, not juries. 175
Second, waiting to death-qualify a separate sentencing jury means the
liability jury is not death-qualified. This change would remove the taint of
prosecution-proneness injected into the proceedings by death qualification's
over-exclusion, not only by demographic group,176 but also by ideology. We
would avoid sweeping all death penalty opponents (with their
accompanying world-views) from the conviction jury, at the same time as
we overwhelmingly seated automatic death penalty voters (with their
accompanying world-views). 177 In addition, this approach would eliminate
the taint of inculcating jurors pretrial with the idea that this defendant is
guilty and that the only real question before them is whether they have the
mettle to sentence him to death.178 In light of the skewing effects of death
173. 476 U.S. 162, 204-05 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
174. Ineligibility for death could result either from (1) conviction of a lesser offense in lieu
of the initial capital crime or from (2) conviction of the capital crime, but lack of a jury finding
on any of the necessary aggravators that can trigger death eligibility. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). See also LEGISLATIVE Div. OF POST AUDIT, STATE OF KANSAS, COSTS
INCURRED FOR DEATH PENALTY CASES: A K-GOAL AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS 32 (Dec. 2003), available at http://www.kslegislature.org/postaudit/
audits-perform/04pa03a.pdf (noting that half of trials in which death penalty was sought
resulted in lesser sentence); JOHN G. MORGAN, COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, TENNESSEE'S
DEATH PENALTY: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES 3 (2004), available at
http://www.comptroller.state.tn.us/orea/reports/deathpenalty.pdf (noting that almost 70% of
trials in which death was sought resulted in lesser sentence: 102 of 148). Prosecutors contribute
to the problem by overcharging, declaring too many cases to be capital ones. Some seek death
sentences routinely, or as a "bargaining chip" to facilitate plea bargains. Id. at i. Others simply
seek death in order to get a death-qualified jury. See, e.g., Salgado, supra note 104, at 519-20 &
nn. 4-7.
175. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.2(a)-(b) (4th ed. 2004)
(describing judges as primary sentencers in all but capital cases).
176. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 65-72 (discussing homogeneous juries' decreased
accuracy in fact-finding).
178. See supra Part III.B.3.c.
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qualification, any principled executioner surely would agree: the defendant
has a legitimate claim to a liability jury that has not been so constituted. 7 9
B. Objections and Responses
Despite the benefits of true bifurcation outlined above, several objections
may be raised: (1) the statutory requirement; 8 ° (2) the costs associated with
accommodating a separate sentencing jury (e.g., the transaction costs of
seating a second jury, as well as the cost of presenting certain evidence
twice); (3) forfeiture of the residual doubt argument; and (4) this proposal's
failure to address the skewing effect of death-qualifying the sentencing jury.
1. The Statutory Requirement
Under presently-existing statutory schemes, true bifurcation simply is
not an option.'81 For example, several circuit courts recently have held that
the Federal Death Penalty Act ("FDPA") 18 2 in most instances will prohibit
the kind of "true bifurcation" that has been discussed here.1 83 As these
courts recently explained, the FDPA states that sentencing hearings in death
cases:
shall be conducted -
(1) before the jury that determined the defendant's guilt;
(2) before a jury impaneled for the purpose of the hearing if-
(A) the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty;
(B) the defendant was convicted after a trial before the court
sitting without a jury;
(C) the jury that determined the defendant's guilt was
discharged for good cause; or
179. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521 (1968) (prohibiting both "tribunals
organized to convict" and those "organized to return a verdict of death").
180. See supra note 11.
181. Id.
182. 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (2000).
183. See United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1353-54 (1 1th Cir. 2006); United States
v. Young, 424 F.3d 499, 506-07 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Green, 407 F.3d 434, 443-44
(1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Williams, 400 F.3d 277, 282 (5th Cir. 2005).
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(D) after initial imposition of a sentence under this section,
reconsideration of the sentence under this section is
necessary; or
(3) before the court alone, upon the motion of the defendant and
with the approval of the attorney for the government.
1 84
The mandate, then, is that the sentencing "shall be conducted ... before
the jury that determined the defendant's guilt." '185 Any other configuration
requires special circumstances: either there was no guilt jury,'86 the guilt
jury is no longer available, 187 or the defendant has waived a sentencing jury
and requested a judge to make the determination. 8
Some defendants (and the trial judges who granted these defendants'
motions for separate juries)1 89 have argued that the FDPA's provision
allowing a separately-constituted sentencing jury if the guilt jury "was
discharged for good cause"'9 ° permits a separately-constituted sentencing
jury to be appointed in all capital cases. They argue that the economic
considerations and skewing effects of death-qualifying the guilt jury
provide "good cause." '91 The circuit courts that reviewed these trial judges'
decisions disagreed. Fundamentally, they said, the good cause provision in
the Act is written as an exception, not a rule.192 The kind of economic and
skewing arguments relied on by the courts in Green, Williams, Young, and
Brown apply to all defendants. Accepting that these reasons provide good
cause to trigger the exception means every case entails good cause to trigger
the exception. Relying on established principles of statutory construction,
such a reading is rejected: the exception would swallow the rule. 93
This interpretation of the FDPA is analytically sound, and therefore it
seems likely that the remaining circuits (and the United States Supreme
184. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b).
185. Id.
186. Id. § 3593(b)(2)(A) to (B).
187. Id. § 3593(b)(2)(C) to (D).
188. Id. § 3593(b)(3). For the effect of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), on judicial
imposition of the death penalty, see supra note 157.
189. See United States v. Young, 424 F.3d 499, 505 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Green,
407 F.3d 434, 440-41 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Williams, 400 F.3d 277, 281 (5th Cir.
2005). The trial judge in United States v. Brown denied the defendant's motion on this point,
and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on appeal. 441 F.3d 1330, 1353-54 (11 th Cir. 2006).
190. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3593(b)(2)(C).
191. See Young, 424 F.3d at 505; Green, 407 F.3d at 440; Williams, 400 F.3d at 281.
192. See Brown, 441 F.3d at 1353-54; Young, 424 F.3d at 506; Green, 407 F.3d at 441-42;
Williams, 400 F.3d at 282.
193. See, e.g., Comnu'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989) ("In construing provisions.., in
which a general statement of policy is qualified by an exception, we usually read the exception
narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision.").
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Court, were it to grant certiorari) would agree: true bifurcation is prohibited
under the existing federal statutory scheme. For the same reasons, those
states with cognate provisions in their death penalty schema presumably
would hold that their language similarly condemns true bifurcation. 194
Some have suggested that the effects of death qualification can be
ameliorated and the statutory unitary jury requirement comported with
simply by seating the maximum number of alternates at a capital trial's
inception.' 95 Proponents of this approach echo Justice Marshall, whose
dissent in Lockhart (in addition to advocating for true bifurcation 9 6)
suggested that any dismissed jurors could be replaced with alternates. 197
Under this proposal, as with the kind of true bifurcation that the statutory
unitary jury requirement prohibits, there would be no death qualification
until after conviction.'" At that time, the death qualification voir dire would
be performed and any jurors who failed to death-qualify could be replaced
with alternates, thus ensuring there would still be a sufficient number of
jurors to deliberate in sentencing.' 99 Judge Gertner suggested this very
alternative in Green.2 °° Unsurprisingly, the prosecution rejected the idea
wholesale, taking as it did the ultimately successful position that it was
entitled to a unitary jury. °'
As with true bifurcation, seating the maximum number of alternates
offers the benefits of a non-death-qualified guilt-phase jury: (1) the costs of
death qualification would be saved whenever a jury returned with an
acquittal; 20 2 and (2) the guilt jury would not be skewed toward guilt, both
because the pool would not be artificially emptied of defense-friendly
jurors, and because the guilt jurors would be spared the influencing effects
194. Compare, e.g., Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b) (2002) (sentencing
"shall be conducted... before the jury that determined the defendant's guilt"), with DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(b) (2005) ("If the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder by a jury,
[the sentencing] hearing shall be conducted . . . before that jury .... "). The Delaware statute's
next sentence permits different jurors to determine punishment if the trial jurors are excused
"for any reason satisfactory to the Court." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(b). Although it could
be argued that this language is broader than the corresponding federal provision, the rationale
governing the FDPA (that death qualification itself cannot be a disqualifier lest the exception
swallow the rule) seems to apply equally to cognate state provisions.
195. See, e.g., Sandys & McClelland, supra note 82, at 407-08.
196. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 204-05 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 204.
198. See id. at 204-05.
199. See id.
200. See United States v. Green, 324 F. Supp. 2d 311, 331 (D. Mass. 2004).
201. See Amended Memorandum and Order Re: Bifurcation at 3 (Nov. 4, 2004), United
States v. Green, 324 F. Supp. 2d 311, 318, 331-32 (D. Mass. 2004).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 172-75.
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of being asked, even before the trial begins, to presume the defendant is
guilty and concentrate on the appropriate punishment.0 3
Seating the maximum number of alternates also offers something true
bifurcation does not: hope of compliance with the unitary jury requirement
under existing law.2° If sufficient additional jurors were seated to hear the
guilt phase, then even after dismissing those jurors who failed to death-
qualify at the post-conviction voir dire, there could still be enough jurors
left to deliberate at sentencing. Thus, the same, unitary jury would hear both
guilt and punishment phases of the trial, excepting any members of the
guilt-phase jury who were dismissed for good cause prior to the sentencing
phase (i.e., they failed to death-qualify). 20 5
In the end, however, this proposal suffers from the same problem any
unitary jury suffers when the jurors are not death-qualified until after
conviction.20 6 Death-qualifying jurors following a conviction suffers from
its own skew. Jurors at that stage simply cannot prevent themselves from
thinking about this defendant as they are being asked the death qualification
questions. Naturally, such thoughts would be premature before the jurors
have heard the sentencing evidence, and therefore are prohibited. To
institute a procedure that ensured jurors began deliberating prematurely
surely would be a mistake.
Thus, seating the maximum number of alternates is not a satisfactory
alternative after all, and the unitary jury requirement does stand in the way
of implementing true bifurcation's benefits. If the only barrier standing in
the way of increasing fairness in our capital punishment system is statutory,
it is difficult to imagine that anyone would be opposed to changing the
offending law. In the end, this is exactly the point of this article. Before
reaching that conclusion, however, a few additional objections to true
bifurcation merit attention.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 176-79.
204. See supra note 152.
205. Of course, it also would be entirely possible-and I suspect it would be highly
likely-that too many jurors would be dismissed, resulting in a need to empanel a new jury for
sentencing in any event. See, e.g., Green, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 331 (anticipating dismissal of too
many jurors to go forward with same jury at sentencing despite having seated maximum number
of alternates).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 166-68.
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2. Increased Costs
The first objection to the concept of true bifurcation offered by those
unfamiliar with the statutory prohibition is increased cost. Certainly there
are increased costs associated with granting all defendants convicted of
capital crimes separate sentencing juries. However, because this proposal
saves the cost of death-qualifying all liability juries, and incurs the
additional costs of a second jury only in those cases where the defendant is
convicted, the net increase would seem to be relatively modest. A net
savings-though perhaps less likely-is conceivable.
In addition, although separate juries may necessitate presenting certain
evidence twice (as when evidence presented to the liability jury is also
relevant to sentencing), this is already a common phenomenon. Of the many
capital defendants who appealed their convictions from 1973 through 1995,
for example, 68% won retrial. 2 7 Thus, attorneys in capital cases are
accustomed to presenting such evidence a second time with minimal cost,
whether by utilizing trial transcripts and exhibits208 or other techniques. 20 9
"Stipulated summaries of prior evidence might, for example, save
considerable time. 2 10
Stipulated summaries may be less compelling than live testimony,
however. One can readily imagine that in some instances the power of live
testimony would be worth the costs of recalling a witness at sentencing. In
those cases, though, it seems likely that the power of live testimony would
be worth recalling regardless of whether the case were being tried before a
separate sentencing jury or before a unitary one. Capital trials as a rule are
quite lengthy, 21' and even a jury that heard the evidence in a liability phase
is unlikely to remember it. Should a trial transcript or similar be deemed
207. JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES,
1973-1995, at 6 (2000), available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/press/reports/pdfs/Error-
Rates-in-Capital-Cases-1973-1995.pdf. Perhaps more startling, of those 68% who won retrial,
82% received a lesser sentence-including 7% who were found not guilty at all. Id. at 7.
208. Such measures are standard and expected. See, e.g., Federal Death Penalty Act, 18
U.S.C.A. § 3593(c) (West 2000).
209. See, e.g., Bruce Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital
Cases: An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 58 (1982)
(suggesting video-taped portions of the guilt phase might be shown to sentencing jury).
210. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 205 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
211. See, e.g., Garey, supra note 172, at 1258 (citing Saunders et al., supra note 172). The
Saunders study found that although noncapital trials averaged twelve days, the average capital
trial required three and a half times as long: forty-two days. Id. A 2003 study in Kansas echoed
this result, finding their nine-day average for non-capital trials also more than tripled to a total
of twenty-eight days for the average capital trial. LEGISLATIVE Div. OF POST AUDIT, supra note
174, at 15 tbl.l-4.
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insufficiently compelling as compared with the original, it seems the live
witnesses would be recalled at the sentencing phase regardless: either to
remind the same jurors in this more compelling fashion of what they once
heard but have since forgotten, or to inform the new jurors in this more
compelling way of what they must know in order to choose an appropriate
sentence.
"Thus," wrote Justice Marshall in Lockhart v. McCree, "it cannot fairly
be said that the costs of accommodating a defendant's constitutional rights
under these circumstances are prohibitive, or even significant.
21 2
3. Residual Doubt
For some in the "unitary jury versus truly bifurcated jury" debate, the
residual doubt argument is the proverbial 800-pound gorilla. After all, "the
best thing a capital defendant can do to improve his chances of receiving a
life sentence . . . is to raise doubts about his guilt. '213 Once again, it is
comforting to know that most214 jurors would hesitate to execute someone
whom they believe might be innocent. If the unitary jury is discarded in
favor of true bifurcation, however, some argue that defendants will be
stripped of the ability to appeal to residual doubt. In light of the recent
Supreme Court decision in Oregon v. Guzek, this may be an
overstatement, 2  but at the very least, the effectiveness of defendants'
appeals to residual doubt surely would be lessened. A jury empaneled solely
for sentencing purposes is in a relatively weak position to second-guess its
predecessor jury's conviction decision. The sentencing jury simply does not
have the necessary information before it.
212. McCree, 476 U.S. at 205 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
213. Garvey, supra note 35, at 1563.
214. The qualifier "most" is necessary because more than 20% of the CJP jurors
interviewed for Professor Garvey's study indicated that "lingering doubt over the defendant's
guilt" had no effect on their likelihood of voting for death. Id. at 1559 tbl.4. Even more
shocking, some measurable number of respondents (2.6%) actually indicated that lingering
doubts over the defendant's guilt made them more likely to vote for death. See id. Society can
only hope that these responses were accidental, intended to be funny, or otherwise not accurate
reflections of juror behavior. In light of additional CJP data wherein jurors asked to give
examples of when they would not vote for the death penalty listed "[ilf the guy was not guilty,"
Sandys & McClelland, supra note 82, at 400, however, perhaps this result should not surprise.
215. Oregon v. Guzek, 126 S.Ct. 1226, 1232-33 (2006) (holding that defendant had no
right to introduce additional residual doubt evidence beyond that entered into evidence at guilt
stage). This decision leaves open the possibility that the United States Constitution guarantees
defendants the right to argue residual doubt so long as they base their arguments solely on
already-admitted evidence. Id. at 1233-34 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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For this reason, some have argued that a unitary jury benefits capital
defendants." 6 Maybe so, but that would be a strategy decision for
defendants to make for themselves; and that decision is complicated by
another strong factor in jurors' sentencing decisions: apparent remorse, or
acceptance of responsibility.2 7 Unitary juries may permit defendants to
argue residual doubt more effectively, but they also undercut defendants'
ability to contest guilt. The jurors who listened to defendants vigorously
assert their innocence at the conviction stage may find it difficult to believe
those defendants who so radically change their tune at sentencing. "I didn't
do it; but if you find I did, I'm really sorry," is a hard sell:
If... a defendant claimed innocence at the guilt phase, and now at
the penalty phase said, "Let me tell you how I ended up doing this
terrible crime," the verdict almost uniformly was death. The jury's
reaction was, "How dare you try to trick us at the guilt phase and
now try to tell us your life circumstances at the penalty phase? ' 218
Thus, "unless the state is willing to grant the defendant the option to
waive this paternalistic protection [of the unitary jury and concomitant
ability to appeal to residual doubt more effectively] in exchange for better
odds aginst [sic] conviction [as would result from true bifurcation], 2 9 the
claim that the unitary jury requirement operates for defendants' own good is
less than convincing. Indeed, "if the evidence in the case raises doubts
about conviction, this is precisely where a defendant might desire a less
conviction-prone excludable juror at the guilt-determination phase. ', 220
Some have indicated a willingness to permit defendants precisely this
choice. Based primarily on input from his own blue-ribbon commission and
then augmented by a suggestion growing out of the Indiana Symposium, 2
2
'
Governor Romney's Massachusetts proposal, for example, suggested that
convicted defendants be permitted the choice of having their punishment
216. E.g., McCree, 476 U.S. at 181.
217. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 35, at 1560-61 (finding that lack of remorse is among the
top three reasons jurors vote for a death sentence).
218. Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury, Open Discussion, 80 IND. L.J. 60, 62 (2005).
219. Michael Finch & Mark Ferraro, The Empirical Challenge to Death-Qualified Juries:
On Further Examination, 65 NEB. L. REV. 21, 69 (1986).
220. Id. at 69 n. 169.
221. Cover letter to "An Act Reinstating Capital Punishment in the Commonwealth," H.R.
3834, 184th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005), available at http://www.nodp.org/ma/
deathpenalty_.4-28-5.pdf ("The attached legislation is based on the work of the Governor's
Council on Capital Punishment, an I l-member panel of scientific and legal experts .. "); see
also REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 17, at 16-17
("New Trial Procedures to Avoid the Problems Caused by the Use of the Same Jury for Both
Stages of a Bifurcated Capital Trial").
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determined either by the jury that convicted them (enabling defendants to
appeal to those jurors' potential lingering doubts about guilt in arguing for
life rather than death) or by a new jury (enabling defendants to avoid death-
qualifying their conviction jury), with this choice available to defendants
either before or after the conviction stage. 2
In any event, the point may very well be moot (at least in federal court if
not among the states, as well). Randy Lee Guzek claimed a Federal
Constitutional right to present residual doubt evidence at sentencing.223 In
finding that no such right, even if one existed, would permit Guzek's
evidence, 4 the United States Supreme Court drew a sharp distinction
between evidence tending to show how a defendant committed a crime and
evidence tending to show whether the defendant did it.225 Given this, Justice
Marshall's dissent in Lockhart v. McCree takes on even greater resonance:
But most importantly, it ill-behooves the majority to allude to a
defendant's power to appeal to "residual doubts" at his sentencing
when this Court has consistently refused to grant certiorari in state
cases holding that these doubts cannot properly be considered
during capital sentencing proceedings. Any suggestion that capital
defendants will benefit from a single jury thus is more than
226disingenuous. It is cruel.
Although the Court finally granted certiorari on the subject, it once again
refused to recognize a right to introduce residual doubt evidence. 27 After
Guzek, the objection that true bifurcation denies defendants the ability to
argue residual doubt rings hollow indeed.
222. H.B. 3834, § 6(B), 184th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005); Joseph L. Hoffmann,
Response to Professors Kamin and Pokorak, 80 IND. L.J. 153, 153 (2005).
223. Oregon v. Guzek, 126 S.Ct. 1226, 1229 (2006).
224. Id. at 1232.
225. Id. at 1231.
226. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 206 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
227. Guzek, 126 S.Ct. at 1233. A window for arguing residual doubt might remain,
however. To Justice Scalia's bitter lamentations, the opinion in Guzek left open the possibility
that there may be a constitutional right to argue residual doubt at sentencing so long as that
argument is limited to already-admitted evidence. Id. at 1233-34 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Additionally, of course, states remain free to permit defendants to argue additional residual
doubt evidence if they so choose. See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (noting
that the state enjoys "power to impose higher standards . . . than required by the Federal
Constitution if it chooses to do so").
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4. Remaining Death Skew
This last of the objections to true bifurcation is perhaps the most serious.
To the extent that true bifurcation is aimed at removing the prosecution-
skew from capital trials, it succeeds with respect to the guilt phase alone.
The process of death qualification, however, serves not only to tilt the
scales toward finding guilt, but also toward finding that death is the
appropriate punishment.228 When potential sentencing jurors are asked
extended, probing questions regarding their feelings about the death
penalty, and likely witness the excusal for cause of several death penalty
opponents while witnessing no excusals for cause from life qualification,229
it is no surprise that they come away with the impression that death is the
appropriate punishment.23 0 Thus, although ceasing to death-qualify the
conviction jury beyond a minimal nullification question would minimize the
prosecution skew from the conviction stage, this measure alone does not go
far enough. True bifurcation leaves in place the death qualification of the
sentencing jurors, thereby continuing to skew the sentencing jury in favor of
death.
This concern is very real. More must be done to address death
qualification's profound failure to provide defendants with any semblance
of an impartial jury,"' or we must recognize the futility of the attempt and
dismantle the machinery of death for good.232 Thus, this article concedes
that true bifurcation does not go nearly far enough.233 But if the failure of
death qualification cannot be mended, and if abolition is out of reach, true
bifurcation is a commonsense, achievable improvement in our capital
punishment system's fairness. At least it is a step in the right direction.
V. CONCLUSION
The unprincipled nature of the unitary jury requirement shames society
as a whole.
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal
punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total
228. See Allen et al., supra note 98.
229. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728 (1992).
230. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.c.
231. See supra Part III.B.3.
232. See supra text accompanying note 151.
233. Nor does this address additional problems revealed by the CJP, such as the prevalence
of automatic death penalty voters and capital jurors' fundamental misunderstandings concerning
mitigation, see supra text accompanying note 151, nor myriad other concerns.
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irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the
convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique,
finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our
concept of humanity.
2 34
The time is right for action. For over fifty years, empirical investigation
has demonstrated that death qualification skews juries toward guilt and
death. With the release of CJP data, gathered via rigorous and
comprehensive methods expressly designed to overcome the flaws
complained of by the United States Supreme Court in Lockhart v. McCree,
any doubts on this score surely have been laid to rest.
Efforts to ameliorate death qualification's prosecutorial bias have been
hamstrung, however, by the statutory unitary jury requirement. Granting for
the sake of argument that some form of death qualification must be
suffered, the addition of a unitary jury requirement leaves capital defendants
unconscionably disadvantaged. Either death qualification is performed on
these jurors pre-conviction, thereby skewing them toward guilt, or it is
performed on these jurors post-conviction but pre-sentencing phase. Post-
conviction, the death qualification questions necessarily prompt jurors to
consider their willingness to put to death, not some capital defendants in
general, but this one in particular. Having just heard the grisly details of this
defendant's death-eligible crime and having just found this defendant
guilty, it would be asking far too much to imagine that these jurors can
divorce themselves from their context. When death qualification questions
are asked post-conviction and pre-sentencing phase, jurors will almost
unavoidably be answering based on their willingness to put this defendant
to death-and that before hearing the first piece of mitigation evidence.
Although several arguments may be raised against true bifurcation, on
reflection it becomes clear that they are either illusory or else readily
managed. In the end, the only real barrier to the benefits true bifurcation
offers is the artificial statutory one erected by the unitary jury requirement.
Such an artificial barrier is unprincipled and should be abandoned.
Although this measure does not go far enough, it is a readily-achievable, if
only incremental, improvement in fairness for capital defendants. Therefore,
the unitary jury requirement should be abandoned in favor of true
bifurcation. If death is to remain a permissible punishment, then capital
defendants must, at the very least, receive the fairest possible trial. Surely
the principled executioner would agree.
234. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
38:0769] 807
HeinOnline  -- 38 Ariz. St. L.J. 807 2006
HeinOnline  -- 38 Ariz. St. L.J. 808 2006
